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RECENT DECISIONS

vidual citizens would instigate prosecution. However, it should also
be noted that the false-impression doctrine is broad enough to include
a very large percentage of current discount-offering ads. Since widespread prosecution seems impractical, the force of the doctrine will
probably be applied in a few isolated cases as a deterrent to other
violators.

CONFLICT OF LAWS-LEx Loci DELICTI HELD APPLICABLE AS
TO AVAILABILITY OF DEFENSE OF CHARITABLE IMMUNITY, REGARD-

LESS OF LAW OF PLACE WHERE CHARITY ORGANIzD.-Plaintiff

brought this action for the wrongful death of his fifteen-year-old
daughter. Decedent fell to her death while on a tour in Oregon conducted by defendant, a charitable organization incorporated under the
laws of New York. One of the affirmative defenses ' pleaded by defendant was that of charitable immunity from tort liability, under the
decisional law of Oregon. The lower court granted a motion to
strike the defense. 2 The Appellate Division modified 3 the ruling by
upholding the validity of this defense, holding that the lex loci delicti
controls as to the availability of the defense of charitable immunity
and not the law of the state where the charity was organized. Kaufman
v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 6 A.D.2d 223, 177 N.Y.S.2d 587,
motion for leave to appeal granted, 6 A.D.2d 1016, 178 N.Y.S.2d
623 (2d Dep't 1958).
In general, the law of the place where a tort was committed is
controlling, 4 not only as to whether a cause of action arose ab initio,"5
but also as to the availability of defenses,6 e.g., charitable immunity.
There is, however, an exception to this rule. Where a strong public
policy of the place of the forum is in direct conflict with the law of
the place of commission of the tort, that public policy must prevail. 7
I Another defense, involving a covenant not to sue, was set up in the answer,
but is not treated here.
2Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 174 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct.
1957)
3The ruling of the Supreme Court as to the defense of charitable immunity was reversed; as to the covenant not to sue, affirmed.
4 Accord, Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, Inc., 266 N.Y. 244, 248,
194 N.E. 692, 694 (1935).
See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT oF LAWS § 166,

comment b, § 377 (1934) ;
1949).

GOODRIcH, CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 95, at 267 (3d ed.

GSee Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 226, 186 N.E.
679, 682 (1933).
6 STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 188-89 (2d ed. 1951). Cf. Fitzpatrick v.
International Ry., 252 N.Y. 127, 169 N.E. 112 (1929).
7Jewtraw v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 280 App. Div. 150, 153, 112
N.Y.S.2d 727, 731 (1952) ; Allison v. Mennonite Publications Bd., 123 F. Supp.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 33

Oregon law grants to charitable institutions immunity from tort
9
liability.$ First established in the courts of England, the doctrine
was adopted in Oregon in 1912.10 A recent attempt to abrogate it
proved fruitless " due to the solid body of decisional law on which
the immunity rests. 12 The foundation of the doctrine has been traced
to the public policy of the state, and Oregon's highest court has said
13
In New York, the
that nothing short of legislation can change it.
rule of charitable immunity was at first adopted,' 4 but had been so
narrowed in interpretation and riddled with exceptions as to have long
5
In the
since been rendered weak and difficult of precise application.'
16
recent case of Bing v. Thunig, it was completely discarded. Therefore, the law of Oregon and New York is in direct conflict as to the
availability of charitable immunity as a defense to a tort action.
The principal case is apparently contrary to the only prior authority in New York. In Heinemann v. Jewish AgriculturalSoc'yyT
plaintiff was injured while in a vehicle owned and operated by defendant, a charitable organization incorporated under the laws of New
York. The injury occurred in New Jersey, which, at that time,
granted charitable immunity from tort liability. The court held that
23, 25 (W.D. Pa. 1954). See also Paulsen and Sovern, "Public Policy" in the
Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 969 (1956).

Cf. Loucks v. Standard Oil

Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
8Ackerman v. Physicians & Surgeons Hosp, 207 Ore. 646, 288 P.2d 1064

(1955), rei/d on other grounds on. rehearing, 207 Ore. 646, 298 P.2d 1026
(1956) ; Landgraver v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Bd., 203 Ore. 489, 280 P.2d
301 (1955).
9Feofees of Heriot's Hosp. v. Ross, 12 Cl. & Fin. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508
(1846). This doctrine was later repudiated, however, in the English case of
Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, 11 H.L. 686, 11 Eng. Rep. 1500 (1866). See
also Note, Immunity of Charitable Institutions to Tort Liability: an Eroding
Defense, 5 DUKE B.J. 51 (1955).
1 Hill v. President & Trustees of Tualatin Acad. & Pac. Univ., 61 Ore.
190, 121 Pac. 901 (1912).
11 See Landgraver v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Bd., supra note 8.
12 See, e.g., Ackerman v. Physicians & Surgeons Hosp., supra note 8; Landgraver v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Bd., supra note 8; Gregory v. Salem Gen.
Hosp., 175 Ore. 464, 153 P.2d 837 (1944); Hamilton v. Corvallis Gen. Hosp.
Ass'n, f46 Ore. 168, 30 P.2d 9 (1934); O'Neill v. Odd Fellows Home, 89 Ore.
382, 174 Pac. 148 (1918); Hill v. President & Trustees of Tualatin Acad. &
Pac. Univ., supra note 10.
13 Landgraver v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Bd., supra note 8.
14 Collins v. New York Post Graduate Med. School, 59 App. Div. 63, 69
N.Y. Supp. 106 (2d Dep't 1901) ; Joel v. Woman's Hosp., 89 Hun 73, 35 N.Y.
Supp. 37 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
1S See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E.
92 (1914); Hordern v. Salvation Army, 199 N.Y. 233, 92 N.E. 626 (1910).
162 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957), wherein the last
vestige of charitable immunity in New York, i.e., the inapplicability of the doctrine of respondeat superior to hospitals in the case of doctors and nurses, was
eliminated.
17 178 Misc. 897, 37 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd iner., 266 App.
Div. 907, 43 N.Y.S.2d 746 (4th Dep't 1943).
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the defendant could not avail itself of the defense of charitable immunity given by New Jersey law.' s The Supreme Court, in the
Kaufman case, felt constrained to follow that decision. 19 The Appellate Division, however, reversed, stating that the Heinemann case
".. . was decided upon reasoning which is not acceptable to us, and
the case is probably distinguishable." 20
The conflict decided by the principal case has primarily arisen in
the federal courts, since diversity of citizenship is generally involved.
Federal cases in point, 21 decided subsequent to the HeinemaInn case,
answered the question as did the principal case, i.e., charitable immunity was made available as a defense in cases where the corporation
was foreign to the place of the tort and where the law of the place
of the tort granted such immunity. This was so, regardless of the
status of the law on charitable immunity in the state where the charity
was organized.2 2 Concerning these cases, the Court, in the principal
case, said: "The case [Heineinann] was decided in 1942, some years
prior to, and therefore without the benefit of, the decisions in the
Hinmizn [and] Jeffrey ... cases ....,,23
The Heinenn holding left New York law on this point nebulous and susceptible of misinterpretation and confusion. 24 The lower
court, in the Kaufman case, interpreted the Heinemann case as refusing to apply the lex loci delicti.25 However, the Heinemann case,

18 Ibid. The decision was based on the reasoning that the defendant would
not have been granted immunity under the law of New Jersey for two reasons:
1. The basis of the doctrine of charitable immunity is the waiver theory, i.e.,
the recipient of a charity waives his right to deplete the funds of the charity
by claims for damages for torts committed arising out of the charitable operations of which he was a beneficiary. But since, in this instance, the relationship between plaintiff and defendant arose out of a contract made in New
York, no waiver would be implied in the face thereof. 2. Defendant had not
qualified itself to exercise its franchise in New Jersey by meeting the statutory
requirements for such organizations and, therefore, would have been unable
to claim charitable immunity in that state. Id. at 905, 37 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
19 Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 174 N.Y.S.2d 580, 587 (Sup.
Ct. 1957).
20 6 A.D.2d 223, 228, 177 N.Y.S.2d 587, 592 (2d Dep't 1958).
21 Hinman v. Berkman, 85 F. Supp. 2 (W.D. Mo. 1949). Accord, Allison
v. Mennonite Publications Bd., 123 F. Supp. 23 (W.D. Pa. 1954), distinguishable by reason of the fact that an intentional tort was involved. See Jeffrey
v. Whitworth College, 128 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Wash. 1955).
22 Hinman v. Berkman, supra note 21, at 3. See Allison v. Mennonite Publications Bd., supra note 21, at 25.
23 Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 6 A.D.2d 223, 228, 177
N.Y.S.2d 587, 592 (2d Dep't 1958).
24 See Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 174 N.Y.S.2d 580, 587
(Sup. Ct. 1957), wherein the court felt constrained to follow Heinemann and
not apply the lex loci delicti. Cf. Jeffrey v. Whitworth College, 128 F. Supp.
219, 225 (E.D. Wash. 1955), in which it seems that both the plaintiff's argument and the court's discussion appear to take the Heineinain case as a rejection
of that same theory.
25 See Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., supra note 24.
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although seemingly a rejection
of the le loci delicti rule, does not
2
actually conflict with it. 6
It is felt that the holding in the Heinemann case should be limited to the specific fact-situation there involved, and not be considered
a leading authority in the general area of the applicability of the
lex loci delicti rule. It is submitted that the principal case states the
correct law on this point and clarifies the New York position. Hence,
the Kaufman case should be the controlling New York case in situations calling for the application of the lex loci delicti rule to cases
involving charitable immunity from tort liability.

TAXATION-DEDUCTION OF FINES AND PENALTIES HELD NOT
PROPER BECAUSE FRUSTRATIVE OF STATE POLICIES. - Taxpayer

sought to deduct as ordinary and necessary expenses 1 fines paid for
violations of a Pennsylvania statute 2 prescribing maximum truck
weights. It was commercially impracticable for taxpayer to comply
with the statute. The Tax Court disallowed the deduction on the
ground that it would frustrate sharply-defined state policy. The Court
of Appeals affirmed. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
held that allowing deduction of fines and penalties would frustrate
state policies by mitigating their deterrent effect. Tank Truck
Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
In a companion case, the Court affirmed an order of the Court
of Appeals reversing a Tax Court determination that amounts expended by a bookmaker for rent and salaries were not deductible
since made in connection with illegal acts. The Court held that since
gambling is recognized as a business for federal tax purposes, taxpayer's normal operating expenses are deductible.8 Commissioner v.
Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
26 See note 18 supra.
: The former version of § 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
provided that in computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered;
. . and rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the
continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of property
to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which he has
no equity." 56 STAT. 819 (1942).
2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 453 (1953), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
75, § 453 (Supp. 1957).
3 The Court distinguishes Tank Truck Rentals, stating that a deduction is
permitted unless the allowance would avoid the consequence of violations of the

law.

Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 29 (1958).

